It’s impossible to start today’s column on any story other
than the passing of Lew Wasserman.
People keep on writing about him as the last of the old time
moguls, but that is a false notion.
He was the architect, not always knowingly, of the modern film
business. He was the man who turned the real old time moguls into dinosaurs.
He was, in the end, the Forrest Gump of the last half-century
of the film business, albeit a very, very, very smart Forrest Gump.
There are some excellent looks at Wasserman’s life out there.
The best is probably from the L.A. Times’ James Bates
for
analysis and the scariest versions of Charlie’s Angels ever,
Bob Welkos, Anita Busch and Claudia Eller (billed as they
are in the paper) for
analysis. But back to Gump…
It was 52 years ago that Wasserman, then an agent, made a deal
that effectively ended the studio system as it had been operating for
decades. And no, I’m not exaggerating.
Wasserman’s deal for Jimmy Stewart on Winchester 73,
for the first time, gave an actor profit participation and talent approval.
Up until then – and for some time after that – the studio system
was a factory business. Ninety-nine
percent of the “staff,” actors included, were paid weekly, whether they
were working or not, whether the films were good or not, whether they
were happy or not. And so, everyone worked a lot. People made a lot of movies. Talent was “loaned” from one to studio to the
other for specific movies. And
if you pissed off the boss, you suffered his wrath.
Oh those good old days…
It drives me nuts when people crave those good old days, thinking
that they could have the autocratic system that existed back then with
the modern benefits of big salaries and strong unions and the freedom
to choose projects. BZZT!!! Wrong. On that day in 1952, the film industry started
its conversion - with a whimper, not a bang. From a factory business
where the company owned the whole thing and sold the product to an independent
contracting business, in which the short-term cost effectiveness of
hiring out for individual jobs overwhelmed in-house production… loyalty,
consistency, apprenticeship and, to some degree, quality, have all suffered
as a result.
Remember, Wasserman was still an agent when he made this deal
happen. It was the right deal
for the talent. It still is
the best thing for the talent… the talent that is on top of the industry. But year by year, every part of this business
changed. Within a decade of the Stewart deal, the only
contract players were the kids coming in off the streets (from acting
classes… but you get my point.) Within
20 years, the contract system was dead.
And the idea of studios contracting actors would still be good
for movies today. There is too
much second-act Hamlet in this business and not enough third-act. But even if you were to try to do it, it would
never happen today, as the evolution of the deal in 1952 has reached
what we can only hope is its apex.
If a studio, for instance, looked at Vin Diesel in Pitch
Black and said, “We’ll give him $35 million for his next five pictures,”
a real studio contract, his agents would probably pass. Why? First, the offer would
suggest that they thought they’d be getting a bargain. Agents hate giving bargains. Second, even if his next picture was only going
to give him $3 million, they see the potential for a guy like that to
pull down a $15 - $20 million payday… not a decade later, but within
three pictures. Again, a loss
for the agent. Third, in this market, the idea of Diesel “suffering”
through five films at one studio where they decide what he does… unbearable.
Hindsight is 20/20. Diesel
has made three films since Pitch Black and will soon start a
fourth. His take is still under
$20 million for the first three films (one is the near-unreleasable
Knockaround Guys at New Line), but he is likely to end up with
more than $50 million for five. He
was also dumped out of The Fast & The Furious 2 for which
Universal was, apparently, willing to go to $15 million, but not $20
million or more.
But what Vin Diessl does affects a lot of other people.
Rob Cohen, for instance, decided not to do TF&TF2
without Diesel. (They are both,
it seems, pretty high on the fumes of XXX.) And XXX itself is at Columbia, not at
Universal, where Cohen has had a long relationship. Essentially, Columbia grabbed the Cohen/Diesel franchise for themselves
for this summer. And the duo,
together or separate, will go wherever the best script/deal/opportunity
is for the next picture.
But it’s more than that… the studios are so busy trying to
get the next Vin Diesel franchise picture – or what they hope
will be a franchise picture – that they are willing to look past the
details. Like the script isn’t really ready, or they have to rush production
and post-production to get to a summer or winter holiday date in order
to generate the massive dollars that are necessary to take advantage
of the assumed blockbuster.
Of course, yours truly was less than generous to John Calley
& Co. when Sony became the primary outlet for teen flicks for a
year or two. That was a profitable
choice… far more profitable than the two years of product that followed. They were making glossy, but inexpensive pictures
that all made profit and all did well on video. But it was not a good image choice. So they moved on to bigger risk/bigger reward
movies. This year, the studio
is doing great. The last two
years were disastrous.
Back to Wasserman…
The next massive move by Wasserman & Co. was to take their
talent agency and to start producing movies. They bought Carl Laemmle’s Universal Studios and Decca Records
with it. Three years later,
in 1962, MCA was forced to give up their position in the talent business
by the federal government, which left Universal/MCA as a major force
in film and music.
Twenty years later, Mike Ovitz would become the perceived
“most powerful man in Hollywood” by emulating Wasserman, translating
agency power into production power, even of the agency was not, by rule,
allowed to produce. Ovitz made
it work masterfully, but came up against what Wasserman wrought. The church and state rules of Hollywood meant
that no matter how much Ovitz could be paid for brokering deals, including
Lew Wasserman’s last big deal (more on that later), he could
never be an owner so long as he was at CAA.
Ovitz would later try to make the move that Wasserman himself
had made in 1936. Wasserman
had gone to work for MCA’s Jules Stein, looking forward to taking
over when Stein stepped down, which happened.
It didn’t work so well for Ovitz when he went to Disney, looking
to step into Michael Eisner’s showbiz shoes when Eisner put on
some slippers or some more corporate CEO shoes.
Wasserman was 20 years younger than Stein… Ovitz was only 4 years
younger than Eisner. It seems that it was all too Iago and not enough
Prince Eisner.
After leaving Disney, Ovitz would again try to do what Wasserman
had going in the late 50s. Managers
in Hollywood had realized that they could do almost anything… taking
a piece of their talent’s income and producing and doing all the stuff
that Universal/MCA had to stop doing 40 years before. The studios did have the added conflict of being distributors, but
the tone of things had changed. The
industry had become so single-serving that the U.S. government seemed
to decide that monopolies were no longer an issue in the entertainment
business. Disney, Viacom, News Corp and Time-Warner all
had major broadcast networks, all kinds of entertainment properties
and even movie exhibition investments.
What were a few aggressive managers in light of all that? But Ovitz was in too late. One
thing that he should have learned from Wasserman… there is such a thing
as too ambitious. Wasserman’s
genius was in building success and then adding a little… then building…
and adding… then building… Television, the holy grail of the last decade,
has been a disaster for everyone who tried to jump in the deep end right
away. People have been wondering why Barry Diller
hasn’t been more voracious in recent years. It’s because he did learn from watching Wasserman.
Build… then grow…
Anyway… Wasserman’s Universal in the 70s and 80s would be an
island of sanity in a period of major upheaval in this business. Steven Spielberg’s Amblin would spark
a flurry of producers’ deals at every studio in town… but Amblin was
the only one that lasted, staying put on the Universal lot to this day. Ron Howard and Brian Grazer’s
Imagine settled in as a Universal partner in the late 80s and, after
trying their own DreamWorks-like move, went private again and remains
a pillar of the Universal business plan to this day.
Wasserman’s final significant act at Universal was selling
Universal. Unfortunately, the
deal was one of Wasserman’s worst… not because he and his MCA shareholders
didn’t do quite well for themselves by selling the company to Matsushita. The failure was in selling “his” company to
a buyer that just wasn’t prepared to move Universal forward.
Wasserman had vision. He
saw the map years into the future.
But the corporate world that finds majors stuck as product-generating
divisions of massive multinationals was not his world. Wasserman was not an old-time mogul. He was a trailblazer… the bridge between the
old factory days and today’s corporate mess.
When Wasserman did the Winchester 73 deal, he was doing
what was best for his client. He
wasn’t trying to kill off the studio system.
Likewise, when Mike Ovitz, this era’s wannabe Wasserman,
brokered the Sony/Columbia deal and the Universal/Matsushita deal, Wasserman
probably didn’t realize that his era was being killed off. Wasserman complained that Matsushita kept him from building Universal.
He was right. Then came Seagram’s and Vivendi… who knows
if that wheel has stopped turning?
Lew Wasserman was a master of this business.
He was driven by self-interest, but, like the best of monarchs,
he was interested in more than that.
He leaves, finally, at a moment when the industry is desperate
for just that… someone who is able to focus on the quarterly earnings
report, but who can see the bigger picture as well. Turmoil reigns at every major studio’s corporate
office with the exception of Fox and Paramount… but that’s only because
Fox is waiting for its satellite future to get settled before moving
full steam ahead. And at Paramount’s
parent Viacom, there is a wise old man named Sumner Redstone
who knows when to hold them and knows when to fold them… he’s not going
to hang himself out of ego, no matter how many time she seems to be
pushing that knife to his nose, wanting to spite his face.
The ground is shaking in Hollywood. Jack Valenti can’t go on forever.
Unions are getting more militant.
Mini-majors are falling away and one major or two could be history
before this decade ends. There has never been a Hollywood Moses who
didn’t have well-lined pockets. But
that would be okay with me. I
am sick to death of all the whining from people in this business that
think the solution starts with their interests.
It’s bigger than that.
Who’s going to step up? Who
is going to wander through our history and do the right thing, even
when he/she isn’t sure what he’s/she’s doing?
Hollywood is, after all, like a box of chocolates.
Lew Wasserman is dead. Long live Lew Wasserman. He has been missed. He will be missed.
READER OF THE DAY is on hold today … fighting over
Star Wars won’t cut it today (though
The Onion is still funny). There
were a lot of things I was going to write about… they will also wait. The truth is, I really didn’t want to write
about Wasserman very much. But
once I started, I couldn’t stop. He
touched so much of the history of this business.
E ME: If you were
king…